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The title of this communication alludes to that of a workshop
recently organized by the Department of Political Planning
which I head in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shortly after
the former Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
(MOPIC) was split in two, and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA) came into existence.
You probably remember that according to the Israeli reading
of the Oslo Interim Agreements, we were not allowed to have
a ministry of Foreign Affairs because it was considered as the
attribute of a sovereignty we were not allowed to enjoy during
the Interim Period. However, after the President of the United
States was illuminated by the vision of a Palestinian State
coexisting in peace with the State of Israel, it all changed. The
Palestinian State enshrined in the presidential vision ceased
being a matter for negotiations. The principle was granted,
the discussion switched to the timetable, the borders, the
powers, the constraints and the commitments and especially
the conditions put by Israel to its establishment. Nonetheless,
on the principle of statehood, there was no more discussion.
So we created the post of Prime Minister and we were
authorized to have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to which
both the US administration and the Israeli government relate
*
 Fatah permanent representative in the Socialist International, Assistant Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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officially under that very name, and thus we do live the paradox of enjoying
more virtual sovereignty while actual sovereignty, or even semi-sovereignty, on
the ground itself, keeps on shrinking.
On the other hand, let us consider another paradox: ever since the Declaration of
Independence of the State of Palestine proclaimed in Algiers, in November 1988,
we, as PLO, spared no effort to obtain recognition of our existence as a sovereign
people, as a state. I would, however, venture to affirm that we are lucky we did not
achieve that in spite of the recognition on of 131 states, we are still only observers
in the UN, and we therefore do not have the right to vote. Nevertheless, if we had
the right to vote as a full-fledged state, we would have to take position on a number
of issues we are so far carefully avoiding. If we were full-fledged members of the
Commission of Human Rights, for example, or of the Security Council, how would
we vote on Chechnya, on the Kyoto Protocol on environment, on Korea, on
Cashmere or on Tibet? Would our government incline towards Liberalism or towards
Social Democracy? Such a choice does not only pertain to internal social and
economic policies, but also induces a series of alliances and behavioral patterns in
the realm of international relations in spite of the fact that elections may reverse
them overnight and in spite of the fact that international relations are in principle
woven between states, and not between regimes. Between the old principle of
sovereignty and the new doctrines of interference, how would we position ourselves?
What place would parameters like Human Rights play in our diplomacy, given the
fact that Human Rights, even within the borders of one sovereign state, have become
an element of International Law? I am not expecting to obtain immediate answers
to those questions but I only want to underline how far we still are from having a
foreign policy in the full sense of the word.
It is not enough to entertain and to develop bilateral and/or multilateral relations
with a series of countries without having a foreign policy worthy of the name. In
many ways, we continue to manage our international relations in the way of the
National Liberation Movement; we have not stopped being in need for and want
literally everyone’s support, big or small, democrats and dictators. The passage
from the international relations of a national liberation movement to the foreign
policy of an independent state, however, is not clearly happening because the very
transition to independence is being thwarted by the crisis and regression of the
Peace Process, the reoccupation of evacuated areas, war and siege and the Israeli-
orchestrated destruction of our national institutions. Indeed, one of the peculiarities
of the Oslo Process was that instead of the classical sequence of independence and
reconstruction, we were supposed to engage in state-building, both at the economic
and the institutional level, before achieving sovereignty on our territory. The
transition, as we know, did not unfold as scheduled and here we are stuck half-
Towards A Palestinian Foreign Policy? - Ilan Halevi
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way: half-liberation movement and half-state, though in fact neither this nor that
with the problems of both. This reflects heavily on the state of our institutions and
our policies in various fields and indeed in the field of our international relations.
Contrary to a misconception widespread in Palestine, foreign policy is not only the
international marketing of a discourse about the conflict, its origin, its character
and the solutions proposed. In the present Palestinian situation, however, the need
for a unified and consistent discourse on the conflict can obviously not be bypassed.
The local, regional and international balance of power, which shapes the conflict,
induces such an imbalance that only through the mobilization of the widest possible
international support for Palestinian rights can we survive at all, both as an institution
and as a people. However, survival strategies do not constitute policies. A foreign
policy involves bilateral and multilateral relations with states and governments
which include alliances and cooperation on the basis of mutual interests and/or
common values and objectives. Nonetheless, it also requires operation of choices
between existing options in terms of general principles and providing global
responses to global challenges.
It should be clear to all that in the advanced process of globalization, not only
of financial markets, but also of political, social and cultural problems and the
refusal or inability to provide answers to global questions are recipe for
marginalizations. In this sense, tribal lobbies and pressure groups on behalf of
specific local interests can never hope to be full-time players on the international
scene, and can at best serve as cover or as auxiliaries for the interests and
strategies of other and bigger actors.
Thus, a philosophy of international relations and explicit or tacit positioning vis-à-
vis global issues appears as an absolute requirement, and obviously this implies
choices in terms of social contents and values. In a democratic system, however,
these options may change with alternating governments as was the case recently in
Brazil or in Spain, where political changes brought about by elections directly
affected foreign policy.
In the situation that I have described earlier, wherein the tasks of a state coexist
with those of a liberation movement, it is a mistake to think in terms of distinct
stages. The need to elaborate a principled foreign policy, or at least to reflect
upon the possible foundations of a Palestinian foreign policy, is immediate and
absolute, even if the lack of effective sovereignty or of clear recognition may
actually delay its implementation. Just as the negotiations and the popular
struggle for independence must go hand in hand with the tasks of economic,
social and institutional construction, we must both continue to manage our
international relations around the need to mobilize international support for our
Palestinian Issues: On The Political Stalemate and Horizons for Release
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national rights and identify a Palestinian consensus or majority in favor of options
in the field of global challenges.
The passage from the external relations of a liberation movement to a state-like
foreign policy, therefore, collides with the day-to-day management of international
sympathy and support to our national rights. If we take once again the example of
Chechnya, it is clear that any expression of sympathy for the Chechen people, and
even more so any condemnation of Russian practices in Chechnya, even if not
supported by any action, may be very costly for the present Palestinian diplomacy
in the short run. After all, Russia is not only a “friendly” country. It is also a
prominent member of the Quartet, on which we depend, which is also the case in
relation to Europe and the UN, in order not to be left alone with the Israelis and
their American protectors.
But Foreign policy is a matter of sovereignty: it affects the life of every citizen,
and shapes the future of the people as a whole. This is why it should in no way be
abandoned to experts, specialists and professionals of diplomatic activity. This is
where the role of society comes to the fore because only pressure from society will
eventually force specialists to operate costly choices, thus, moving from the
international relations of a national movement to the foreign policy of a people
determined to be the actor of its own destiny.
Paradoxically here again, until ten years ago, which is to say until the establishment
of the Palestinian National Authority, we seemed to enjoy a much greater margin
of maneuver while the Fatah-dominated PLO leadership operated on the
international scene as a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Twenty
years ago we organized secret conversations between the Vietnamese government,
which then occupied Cambodia, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk who was at the
time in exile in China. The conversations took place in France, in Fère-en-
Tardennois, and they had been prepared by our Ambassador in Beijing at the time,
Mustafa Abu Hadid, with the support of Sami Musallam, who represented the
President, and Amin Abu Hassira, now Ambassador in Gabon, who was at the time
in PLO office in Paris. In the early seventies, Yasser Arafat had succeeded in averting
a major Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis while in the early nineties, as we were already engaged
in the Madrid-Washington negotiations, we could still mediate between the Northern
and the Southern Yemeni leaders who were once again at war after the formal
reunification of the country.
Can we, at this stage, identify the nucleus of a Palestinian consensus on general
principles upon which one may found the philosophy of international relations
guiding our foreign policy? Obviously, such a nucleus would rely upon the
contemporary experience of the Palestinian people and carry a particular message
Towards A Palestinian Foreign Policy? - Ilan Halevi
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in terms of values: the defense of Human Rights, the insistence on International
Law and the struggle against racism and ethnic cleansing policies, as well as support
for national rights whenever and wherever violated with a particular sensitivity to
refugee issues - all those derive directly from the Palestinian collective experience
and form part of an implicit national consensus. It should therefore be clearly
formulated as the embryo of a foreign policy doctrine.
This nucleus must be put in the context of our basic commitments, as part of the
UN, as partners in the Euro-Mediterranean process and in the EU’s neighborhood
policy and as full members of the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement.
Let me dismiss at once the often heard objection that we are too small, or too poor,
to afford the luxury of such a choice. Small countries can play a totally
disproportionate international role if they are consistent with a particular message.
The challenge, however, does not consist in playing a leading role but in avoiding
being marginalized. I would add cynically that many states proclaim their attachment
to noble principles and values which they systematically or sporadically violate in
practice, while the reluctance to wave any principle at all amounts to a deliberate
declaration of marginality.
I call such a nutshell of general principles the New Non-Alignment. For what
made the philosophical content of the old non-alignment was not only the will to
escape integration into one of the two rival military Blocks. Ever since the Bandoeng
Afro-Asian Conference of 1955, which laid down the foundations of the Movement,
these orientations were clearly formulated: the concept of peaceful coexistence
between different regimes was promoted, before de-Stalinization in the USSR
brought it back on the agenda in the aftermath of the XXth Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party and the Khruschtchev report in 1956. Likewise, the movement
explicitly called for dialogue of cultures, religions and civilizations, as well as for
the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes while being totally committed to
the struggle for the liberation of peoples from the yoke of colonial domination
which was unfolding at the time.
Today, there is no Cold War any more but there is a new Global Enemy for the only
remaining military superpower, and a new attempt to enlist the whole world into a
new global war. As Bush said, “Either with us or against us”. It matters little that the
enemy is designed as Terror. Everybody knows the target is Islamic societies, and the
underlying philosophy of this crusade waged under the banner of the export of
democracy by force, is the nefarious concept of the clash of civilizations, or, as Gilbert
Achcar rightly puts it, the clash of barbarisms. Given our own position in this
configuration, do we have any choice but be “non-aligned” vis-à-vis this new cleavage?
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The recourse and reference to International Law cannot, of course, be one way
alone. International Law, by definition, is indivisible and we cannot disregard the
rules we demand to be protected by. As an example, we cannot ask for the protection
of the Geneva Convention and condone operations against civilians (which includes
settler-babies), i.e. against protected persons under the terms of the IVth Geneva
Convention.
To conclude, I would like to emphasize once again the double character of the
transition we are involved in: to complete through negotiations and popular
mobilization - without entering here into a discussion on the forms, tactics and
methods of the latter - the liberation of the Occupied Territory, while engaging into
the construction of our economy, our political system and our civil society. These
simultaneous tasks often appear contradictory. National liberation demands a large
measure of national unity and negotiations require an unanimous popular mandate
while the building of a democratic order and the emancipation of civil society
imply the absolute freedom of expression of contradictory hypotheses and proposals
in all fields of public life. The ambiguous character of this phase indeed reflects
upon the definition of an appropriate foreign policy. It cannot, however, serve as a
justification for remaining defensive and reactive on the international scene.
Moreover, there is no doubt that we will be in a better position to mobilize
international support for our specific national rights if we act as full-fledged players
on the global scene than if we hide behind our weakness in order to remain neutral
in the face of other conflicts and issues. Nevertheless, the institution itself will
probably not gather the energy required to move ahead on this path on its own. It
will have, as in many other areas, to be pushed by society itself and this is where
all citizens are responsible.
In short, let me repeat that “a foreign policy adapted to the requirements of the
Twenty-First century”, which is to say a foreign policy that has absorbed the
globalization of issues and the changes in the international system of states, “must
be ambitious and its peaceful objectives must be pursued in an offensive manner.
Either we conquer an active place in the concert of nations, or we will be
marginalized”. (1)
(1)
 “A Foreign Policy for the 21st Century”, document produced for an internal discussion held in
MOPIC in September 2000, one week before the beginning of the second Intifada.
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Forms of Palestinian Resistance to Occupation:
A Rational Choice Perspective
By Dr. Martin Beck*
1. Introduction
The Graduate Institute of International Studies at Birzeit
University took a both courageous and proper step by
deciding to organize a conference on Palestinian Issues:
On the Political Stalemate and Horizons for Release, held
at Birzeit University on May 7th and 8th, 2004. It is
courageous because focusing on Palestinian potentials to
find a way out of the stalemate under the condition of
tightened Israeli occupation and the resulting constraints
for Palestinian actors is much more difficult both from an
intellectual and a psychological point of view than lamenting
on the Israeli policy and the extremely harsh reality faced
by the Palestinian people as a result of this policy. It is proper
because critical science means to give an input to the active
audience, which is Palestinian rather than Israeli in the case
of Birzeit University.
The task of the present paper is to contribute to the conference
task of providing the Palestinian public with academic
reflections on options for political action. For this purpose,
applying the rational choice approach seems appropriate
because it is, theoretically and methodologically, a sound
Palestinian Issues: On The Political Stalemate and Horizons for Release
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sophisticated tool of Social Science that can be used to analyze politics, as well
as to advice political actors. Since the latter purpose is especially relevant here,
the basic question to be dealt with is what forms of resistance to occupation are
to be classified as (ir)rational and therefore, should (not) be pursued by
Palestinian political actors.
Beyond having an aim, a basic prerequisite for a rational choice is to actually
have a choice. Yet, a popular argument among Palestinians, which is put
forward, especially in ethical debates on bombing attacks in Israel, is not to
have a choice at all. For obvious reasons, this is an ideologically driven, rather
than a scientifically sound, argument since not all Palestinian political groups
and individuals (sharing the aim of achieving Palestinian self-determination)
seize the very same mean. Rather, a broad variety of strategies is pursued;
beyond military attacks in Israel and the Occupied Territories, different forms
of civil disobedience and protest actions (e.g. against the Wall), in addition to
negotiations with Israel are carried out. Yet, although Palestinians have choices,
they are certainly constrained to an extraordinarily high degree by actors of
the regional system, especially Israel, as well as the international system,
especially the USA. However, the rational choice approach advices us, first,
to analyze the constraints and, second, to choose the best option still available
under the constraints.
As a result of an intensive theoretical debate on the rationality of aims, most scholars
came to the conclusion that the rational choice approach displays its strength if it
focuses on the rationality of means, how to achieve a given aim, rather than on a
discussion of the underlying aims.1 The present contribution will also primarily
deal with means rather than ends. Yet, before doing so, a brief discussion on the
political aims of the Palestinian actors in their struggle against occupation is
necessary since only if we know about the aims of an actor it makes sense to
analyze the best means available to achieve them (Chapter 2).
Rational choice theory is not an idealistic approach. Rather, it systematically
takes into consideration the constraints under which actors’ decisions are made.
In other words, although the rational choice approach is a normative theory telling
us “what we ought to do in order to achieve our aims aswell as possible”2, it is
not an ethical theory (telling us what we ought to do in order to meet moral
1
 Miles Kahler, Rationality in International Relations, in: International Organization 52.4, 1998, pp.
921-924.
2
 Jon Elster, Introduction, in: Jon Elster (ed.), Rational Choice, New York: New York University
Press, 1986, p. 1.
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standards). Thus, the task of this paper is to clarify which of the available options
Palestinian actors should take in order to achieve their aim under the condition of
actual constraints, regardless whether these constraints are fair or unfair. Keeping
this in mind, Chapter 3 will critically assess the strategies pursued by major
Palestinian actors in recent history, thereby asking whether they were appropriate
to achieve the aspirations of the Palestinian people or not. Thus, according to the
rational choice approach, this issue will be dealt with from a strategic, rather than
an ethical perspective. Yet, it must be taken into consideration that ethical
perceptions of other actors, especially if they are powerful, may have repercussions
on the Palestinians’ strategic situation. In other words, ethical perceptions of
powerful actors on strategies pursued by Palestinian agents today may constitute
chances or constraints on options available to the Palestinians tomorrow, whether
this would be a result of a fair or an unfair process.
A after assessing the Palestinian struggle against occupation in recent history and
its (negative) strategic repercussions for this struggle against occupation, the task
of Chapter 4 is to reflect whether other (better) options, that would be more
appropriate in order to achieve Palestinian aspirations, are available. Finally, in
Chapter 5, a conclusion will be presented.
2. The Palestinian Aim of Self-Determination
An overwhelming majority of Palestinian political actors and individuals agree
that their general goal is to achieve self-determination by putting an end to the
Israeli occupation of their land. Yet, shared overall goals do not necessarily constitute
agreement on more concrete aims. Also, in the Palestinian case, different models
of self-determination are discussed.
Due to the social realities created by occupation and the fact that the viability
of a Palestinian nation state, even on the whole of the Palestinian Territories
occupied in 1967, is questionable, Jenab Tutunji and Kamal Khaldi present a
sophisticated argument that a bi-national state would be the “rational choice”
for Palestinians.3 More recently, as a result of the failure of the Oslo Peace
Process, the aim of establishing a bi-national Jewish-Palestinian state on the
whole territory of historical Palestine re-gained momentum among prominent
Palestinian scholars and politicians alike.4 However, the two by far most
3
 Jenab Tutunji/Kamal Khaldi, A Binational State in Palestine: The Rational Choice for Palestinians
and the Moral Choice for Israelis, in: International Affairs 73.1, 1997, pp. 31-58.
4
 See the contributions of George Giacaman and Ali Jarbawi in this volume.
-14 -
Palestinian Issues: On The Political Stalemate and Horizons for Release
important political groups in Palestine, Fatah and Hamas, still prefer to establish
an independent Palestinian nation state, which is also the outcome favored by
a majority of the Palestinian people.5 Moreover, contrary to Tutunji and Khaldi,
it is not clear whether the recent suggestions of a bi-national state mentioned
above reflect a serious preference, or rather a tactical move, in order to convince
the Israeli side to accept a Palestinian nation state without ifs and buts. The
rationality behind demanding a bi-national state as a tactical move is that the
identity of all major Jewish Israeli groups and parties, as well as of the
overwhelming majority of the Jewish people, is to preserve the Jewish character
of Israel. Thus, since a bi-national state would be a nightmare to Israel,
demanding it could be more suitable than anything else for convincing Israel
to finally accept a sovereign Palestinian nation-state in the borders of the
territories occupied in 1967. However, the problem of demanding a bi-national
state as a mere tactical move is that the demand’s character as a real threat to
Israel depends on its credibility. Again, the credibility depends on actions taken
by the Palestinians showing their real (rather than tactical) commitment to the
bi-national solution by implementing actions, such as the self-dissolution of
the Palestinian Authority, revision of Fatah’s program and mass demonstrations
for equal citizenship rights in the State comprising all territories ruled by Israel
since 1967. Yet, as long as there are very few, if any, indicators that relevant
Palestinian actors could go for such a strategy, demanding a bi-national state
would be most likely inefficient.
Our brief discussion of the concrete aim connected to the general Palestinian
aim of self-determination generates two findings. First, although there are some
arguments that pursuing the aim of a bi-national state would be indeed rational,
the academic and political discussions on the bi-national approach alike are
still in the beginnings. However, even if in the future, as a result of a more
extensive debate on the rationality of Palestinian aims, the Palestinian leadership
and/or the Palestinian people drew the conclusion that pursuing a bi-national
state would be a more rational approach than attempting to achieve an
independent Palestinian nation state, there can be no doubt that to date, the
latter approach is dominant among Palestinian actors. Thus, second, by dealing
with this preference as a matter of fact, the task of this paper is to clarify what
means are available to the Palestinians in order to achieve the given aim of an
independent Palestinian nation state.
5
 Yet, it is worthwhile mentioning that, according to a poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and
Communication Center (JMCC) in October 2003 (Poll No. 49, available at www.jmcc.org, May 23rd,
2004), one fourth of the Palestinians favors a bi-national state.
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3. Constraints for Achieving a Palestinian Nation State
The major obstacle to be removed before a Palestinian state can be established is
Israeli occupation. Although Israel formally approved the right of Palestinian
statehood in principle in 2003 by accepting the Road Map,6 it is still questionable
whether the establishment of the State of Palestine is ahead. The reason behind
this is not that Israel would prevent the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
from announcing a Palestinian state. If the PLO would do so, Israel could easily
recognize this state in the borders of areas A (and B), i.e. in the patchwork carpet
already administered by the Palestinian Authority since the 1990s. If such state
were declared, not much more than the label of statehood would be achieved,
thereby leaving all major development options of Palestine at Israel’s mercy.
3.1 The Impact of the Power Asymmetry between Israel and the PLO
The fact that the PLO refrained from unilaterally announcing a Palestinian state
after the failure of the Oslo Peace Process indicates the superior power position of
Israel vis-à-vis the PLO. In at least four major fields (military, economy, diplomacy,
politics), Israel’s power capabilities far outweigh those at the disposal of the PLO.
Israel’s army is one of the strongest worldwide whereas the weapon arsenal available
to the Palestinians is low developed, even for standards of a Third World Country.
Moreover, the Palestinian economy has been dependent on access to the Israeli
labor market for decades and, as a result of Al-Aqsa Intifada and the Israeli reaction
to it, an increasing proportion of the Palestinian society has even become dependent
on international food aid.7 At the same time, Israel’s advanced economy provides
its citizens with one of the highest per capita income structures worldwide.
Furthermore, while Israel is firmly allied with the only left superpower, the USA,
the supporters of the PLO suffer from weak positions in the international system.
Finally, Israel enjoys the ability to flexibly respond to crisis situations since its
democratic system provides it with the capacity to adapt to new circumstances,
whereas the authoritarian Palestinian system lacks the ability to develop appropriate
problem-solving strategies.
There can be no doubt that Palestinian options to achieve the aim of national
independence are highly constrained by Israel’s superior power capabilities. Since
the foundation of the PLO, the main Palestinian actors have basically perceived
6
 The Israeli cabinet formulated some reservations to the Road Map. However, the aim of establishing
a Palestinian state, which is, contrary to the Oslo Accords, a clearly stated aim of the Road Map, was
not among them.
7
 Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Palestinian Territories, London, October 2003, pp. 17-20.
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two main options: armed struggle and negotiations. Over time, there have been
intensive debates among different Palestinian actors on the right option to choose.
In the early years of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination, armed struggle
was given priority in theory and, to a growing degree in the course of the 1960s,
also in practice. Yet, since the mid-1970s and more outspoken in the 1980s,
Fatah-originally a Guerilla movement which became the dominant PLO faction
under the leadership of Yasir Arafat after the June War of 1967 when Israel
occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem-started to
embark primarily on the strategy of negotiating a Palestinian state. A breakthrough
on this strategy seemed to be achieved when the PLO and Israel agreed upon the
Oslo Accords in the 1990s.
3.2 Limits of a Negotiated Peace with Israel
When the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles in 1993, two major aspects
proved the way Israel’s power constrains Palestinian options. First, in order to
only enter (serious) negotiations with Israel about major issues on occupation,
such as Palestinian statehood, settlements and the reign over Jerusalem, the
PLO had to denounce all forms of armed struggle in Israel, as well as in the
Occupied Territories and to fully recognize Israel as a legitimate state in the
borders of 1949. Before the PLO was ready to do so, Israel could afford not
only to ignore the PLO, but even to avoid any official statement that a
Palestinian people exist. Thus, the value of the Palestinian bargaining chips of
relinquishing use of force and an unconditional recognition of Israel was not,
as originally aspired by the PLO, sufficient to buy off occupation. Rather,
relinquishing use of force and recognizing Israel as a legitimate state entitled
the Palestinians only with limited autonomy and the chance to conduct
negotiations on occupation. Second, since the PLO did not achieve more than
an agreement on bilateral negotiations with Israel based on resolutions 242
and 338 of the United Nations Security Council (whereas, for example,
Resolutions 181 and 194 of the United Nations General Assembly were not
mentioned), it was obvious that the Palestinian aspiration of achieving a
sovereign state in the whole of the Occupied Territories could hardly be the
outcome of the negotiations. To put it differently, according to the design of
the Oslo Accords, the PLO’s maximum position was structurally limited to a
sovereign Palestinian nation state on the territories occupied in 1967 (plus
Israel’s recognition of the right of return). Yet, the expectation of the PLO to
realize its maximum position was not realistic, especially since there was no
reason to assume that Israel would refrain from taking advantage of its superior
power capabilities in pure bilateral negotiations.
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When the PLO did not agree to what the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak
offered in the frame of the Camp David and Taba negotiations in 2000 and 2001,
which was of course, much less than the aspirations of the PLO, its leadership kept
on insisting on further negotiations.8 However, at latest with the election of Ariel
Sharon as new Israeli Prime Minister in February 2001, it became evident that
there was no Israeli counterpart committed anymore to what his predecessor had
offered, not to mention an Israeli government ready to make further concessions.
Simultaneously, different opposition movements started to build the forefront of
the spontaneous uprising of the Palestinian people against occupation, thereby
institutionalizing the resumption of using force against Israel, which implied the
termination of one of the basic principles of the Oslo Accords. Since the Palestinian
Authority proved to be unable and/or unwilling to crush armed resistance against
Israel, especially Israeli civilians inside the Green Line, the Palestinian leadership
had lost its function from the Israeli point of view. Accordingly, Israel aimed at
going back to square number one, i.e. to marginalize the PLO leadership as had
been done in the era before the Oslo Process. Due to its superior power capabilities,
Israel managed to do so in a fairly short period of time. Already in a speech delivered
on June 24, 2002, US-President George W. Bush officially adopted the Israeli
position of considering Palestinian President Arafat as irrelevant. Since he had
used his room for maneuver in the 1990s to establish an authoritarian regime,
thereby inhibiting the emergence of an alternative leadership in Palestine, Israel
got into the strategically favorable situation of an adversary whose international
credibility was destroyed, leaving him, however, enough internal power to prevent
any dynamic development in Palestine that could impose pressure on Israel to go
back to the negotiation table.
The first major structural finding of the brief examination of recent Palestinian
history presented above is that the chance of a negotiated peace with Israel
meeting the Palestinian aspirations of a fully sovereign state in all of the
Palestinian Territories occupied in 1967 is bleak. First, since all influential
political actors in Israel are interested in avoiding such an outcome to a more or
less degree, and second, since Israel enjoys the power capabilities to prevent it
from becoming a reality, the likelihood of this scenario is very small unless a
revolutionary change in the Israeli preference structure and/or the power
distribution between the two actors occurs. In other words, in in the foreseeable
future, the likelihood that negotiations with Israel will fall short of what even
moderate Palestinian groups would expect as minimum requirements of an
8
 Helga Baumgarten, The Myth of Camp David Or the Distortion of the Palestinian Narrative, Birzeit:
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies, 2003, pp. 41-42.
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acceptable peace treaty with Israel is extremely high.9 One of the major
shortcomings of the PLO in the 1990s was to veil this fact instead of admitting
that Palestine’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Israel was much too weak to achieve
what it officially claimed would, sooner or later, come out as the result of
negotiations with Israel: a fully sovereign Palestinian state comprising all of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip with Al-Quds as its capital (plus the right of the
Palestinian refugees to return to their homes located in Israel).
3.4 Limits of Armed Struggle
Immediately after the release of the Oslo Accords, some Palestinian movements,
especially Hamas, heavily criticized it. Yet, only when Palestinians were
continuously exposed to prolonged occupation in the 1990s, at the same time,
realizing to an accelerating degree that the Peace Process between the PLO and
Israel would not meet its aspirations, resuming to armed struggle became
increasingly popular among Palestinians. To date, a clear majority of Palestinians
supports armed attacks against Israel, including civilians inside the Green Line.10
Since this paper is based on a rational choice approach, dealing with the strategic
question: what options Palestinians should embark on in order to achieve their aim
of self-determination, the ethical problem of bombing attacks against civilians is
not an issue here.11 Rather, the question to be dealt with here is whether the armed
struggle by major Palestinian actors of Al-Aqsa Intifada, especially Hamas, Islamic
Jihad and Al-Aqsa Brigades, is a promising strategy for the Palestinian aim of self-
determination. Since available data is not firm enough to definitely decide the
question whether armed struggle is supposed to be a tool to force Israel back to the
negotiation table or rather, a mean to make Israel unilaterally withdraw from the
Occupied Territories, both possibilities are to be taken into account.
Bombing attacks against Israeli civilians inside the Green Line are only one among
numerous forms of armed attacks conducted by Palestinian actors. Actually,
9
 The finding of a poll conducted in October 2003 by Birzeit University was that the Geneva Agreement
lacks a majority among Palestinians (available at http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/DSPNEW/polls/geneva/,
May 23rd, 2004). At the same time, it is not foreseeable that an Israeli government could be ready to
make the concessions required to approve the Geneva Agreement.
10
 See polls conducted by the JMCC, available at: www.jmcc.org, May 23rd, 2004.
11
 According to the value system of international human law, which I personally share without
restrictions, bombing attacks against civilians are crimes against humanity (Martin Beck, Prospects
for and Obstacles to Achieving a Viable Palestinian State: What Can an Actor With Inferior Power
Capabilities Do in a Graduated Prisoner’s Dilemma?, Birzeit: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of
International Studies, 2004, pp. 28-32).
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according to official Israeli figures, the vast majority of armed attacks are conducted
in the Occupied Territories.12 However, from a strategic point of view, it is decisive
that a aa ttacks against civilians create such an extraordinarily high degree of outrage,
among Israeli and Western observers and political actors alike, that other military
and non-military forms of Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation are,
deliberately or unconsciously, neglected in their perceptions. Furthermore, bombing
attacks against Israeli civilians are not perceived, and actually are not, isolated
actions of some marginal terrorist cells. Rather, major opposition groups, as well
as Al-Aqsa Brigades (loosely) affiliated with Fatah, are committed to this strategy.
Yet, contrary to Israeli claims, a direct involvement of President Arafat or other
members of the Palestinian Authority (PA) could not be proven.13 However, the PA
was either not willing or not capable (or both) of efficiently containing Palestinian
attacks inside the Green Line. If it were the first possibility, the conclusion to be
drawn is that the PA takes part in the political responsibility; if it were the latter,
the conclusion is that groups that are committed to the strategy of attacks targeting
civilians partially took over control in the crucial field of Palestinian security politics.
Although there is a causal relation between the Israeli policy of targeting the political
infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority by military means on the one hand, and
the partial loss of control by the Palestinian Authority on the other,14 the growing
strength of groups conducting bombing attacks also reflects their legitimacy in the
Palestinian society. In other words, even under the condition of a seriously weakened
authority, Palestinian groups committed to the strategy of targeting Israeli civilians
could not succeed in the Palestinian system if their strategy did not enjoy a high
degree of legitimacy in their society.
Needless to say that the outside perception of the Palestinian struggle against
occupation, which is very often blamed as entirely illegitimate, is not founded on
a sound and fair assessment. Very frequently, those Palestinian groups, whose
struggle against occupation targets the military infrastructure of occupation and
those who are committed to civil forms of resistance, are ignored. Moreover, many
outside observers do not take the causal relation between the hardships of occupation
and the forms of struggling against it into consideration. Last but not least, there is
12
 Israeli Defense Forces, Total of Attacks in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Home Front Since September
2000, 2004, available at: http://www.idf.il, May 23rd, 2004.
13
 Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Attacks Against Israeli Civilians, October
2002, available at: www.hrw.org, May 23rd, 2004.
14
 Martin Beck, Rationalismus, Ethik und Krieg: Zur Moral und Logik der “Operation Schutzschild” im
Frühjahr 2002 <Rationality, Ethics and War: On Moral and Logic of the Israeli “Operation Defensive
Shield” in Spring 2002>, in: ?sterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 31.4, 2002, pp. 453-456.
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a tendency among Western observers to give higher credibility to armed attacks by
regular forces of a state, such as Israel, than to violence conducted by non-state
actors, even though there is no good reason to assume that armed attacks committed
by regular forces are per se committed on the basis of high ethical standards.
However, although the outside perception of the Palestinian struggle described
above is not appropriate, it is also not totally unfounded. The popular Palestinian
argument that Palestinians do not have any chance of resistance to occupation
beyond committing bombing attacks against civilians is obviously wrong as is
proven by the mere fact that there are numerous forms of resistance in Palestine.
Thus, it is by no means appropriate to claim that Palestinian bombing attacks against
Israeli civilians are a (justifiable) result of a strategic situation in which no other
options are available.15
The major strategic impacts of bombing attacks targeting civilians are, first,
weakening the Palestinian position on the diplomatic level and, second,
strengthening its adversary on the political level. Palestinian bombing attacks paved
the way for Israel to isolate President Arafat, thereby, postponing serious
negotiations with the Palestinians to the indefinite future. Thus, the first finding of
discussing the strategic impact of suicide attacks is that conducting them was a
complete failure-if and insofar this strategy was supposed to force Israel back to
the negotiation table.
Palestinian militant attacks strengthened the political position of the Israeli
government vis-à-vis the PLO and the Palestinian Authority because it united all
major Israeli groups by creating the spirit of being members of “one family” among
the overwhelming majority of Israeli citizens. There are strong indicators that,
other things being equal, social and cultural cleavages in the Israeli society are
particularly intensive. Also, the degree to which different Israeli social groups are
interested in maintaining occupation over all of Palestine, as well as the readiness
to invest resources in occupation instead of using it for other purposes, varies
among different social groups in Israel. Thus, rather than taking advantage of the
potential divisions among Israelis, thereby constraining the room for the Israeli
government’s maneuvering abilities, Palestinian militant attacks conceal them.
15
 I venture to argue that this argument is even insulting to the vast majority of Palestinians who
decided to stay alive, be it in order to resist to occupation by other means or simply by coping with the
hardships of occupation in order to make the lives of their families bearable. One of the psychological
problems of bombing attacks as a major form of resistance is its elitist nature. Instead of being proud
to deal with the hardships of occupation on a daily basis and/or to resist with the limited means
available to “ordinary people”, those who glorify suicide attackers as “martyrs” feel guilty for having
failed to sacrifice their lives “for Palestine”.
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Moreover, internal pressure on the Israeli government to refrain from exercising
force contradicting standards of international law was significantly reduced. For
instance, according to a report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in May
2002, “during their incursion into the Jenin refugee camp, Israeli forces committed
serious violations of international human law, some amounting prima facie to war
crimes.”16 Nevertheless, in a poll conducted only one month after the release of the
HRW report, some 80% of Jewish Israelis backed this kind of military operations.17
Planning and building the wall in the West Bank without significant resistance by
the Israeli society (and the US government) is another strong indicator supporting
the argument that bombing attacks could be and actually were efficiently used by
the Israeli government as justification for intensifying the occupation regime,
especially in the West Bank. Prime Minister Sharon’s plan of unilateral withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip, an idea which the Israeli government came out with for the
first time in December 2003,18 does not contradict this finding. This is actually
evident in two main facts. First, Prime Minister Sharon made clear that, prior to
the withdrawal, Israel will foster its control on the Southern border between the
Palestinian part of Rafah and Egypt, thereby controlling access to and from the
latter, the only land border of Gaza Strip beyond the one with Israel. Furthermore,
Prime Minister Sharon also declared to control access to and from Gaza Strip by
air and water. Second, Israel clarified that it expects to get rewarded for the
“concessions” made in Gaza Strip by the admission to firmly tie major parts of the
West Bank to Israel. Accordingly, the USA officially welcomed the Israeli
“Disengagement Plan” on April 14, 2004, at the same time, declaring that “in light
of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations
centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will
be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” Furthermore, by
stating that “the United States understands that after Israel withdraws from Gaza
and/or parts of the West Bank, and pending agreements on other arrangements,
existing arrangements regarding control of airspace, territorial waters, and land
passages of the West Bank and Gaza will continue”19, US-President Bush approved
the plan of Israel’s Prime Minister Sharon of maintaining major pillars of the
occupation regime even after implementing the “Disengagement Plan.” Thus, the
16
 Human Rights Watch, Jenin: IDF Military Operations, May 2002, available at: www.hrw.org, May
23rd, 2004.
17
 Ephraim Ya’ar./Tamar Hermann, Peace Index June 2002, 2002, available at: http://spirit.tau.ac.il/
socant/peace/peacindex/2002/files/june2002e.doc.
18
 Peretz Kidron, Olmert Turns Dove, in: Middle East International, No. 715, 2003, pp. 11-14.
19
 The White House, Statement by the President, April 14, 2004, available at: http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-2.html, May 23rd, 2004.
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second finding of discussing the strategic impact of Palestinian bombing attacks is
that they were a complete failure if, and insofar, this strategy was supposed to
force Israel to unilaterally terminate occupation.
The intermediary result of this chapter is that, regardless of the ethical assessment
of bombing attacks in Israel, their strategic impact proved to be a disaster for the
Palestinian struggle against occupation. As detailed above, this assertion holds
true whatsoever purpose was pursued by this strategy, forcing Israel to unilaterally
withdraw from the Occupied Territories or pushing the Israeli government back to
the negotiation table.
4. Alternative Approaches to the Palestinian Struggle
against Occupation
One of the major findings of the analysis presented above is that-given the power
asymmetry between Israel and the PLO-in the foreseeable future, there is virtually
no chance that negotiations with Israel would result in an agreement realizing all
major aspirations of the Palestinians. There are two possible conclusions to be
drawn. The moderate one is to accept that in the foreseeable future any negotiated
peace with Israel will require from Palestinians to bow to superior Israeli power to
a certain degree; the radical one is to postpone the establishment of a Palestinian
state until the general conditions are more favorable to the Palestinian side. In the
following, first, the moderate and then, the radical approach will be dealt with in
more detail.
4.1 The Moderate Approach
Those who are ready to come to terms with the implications of superior Israeli
power capabilities have two non-excluding options. First, they could (and should)
attempt to diminish the degree to which Israel is able to effectively use its superior
power capabilities. Second, they could (and should) try to embark on strategies to
reduce the power gap between Palestine and Israel.
4.1.1 Diminishing the Degree to which Israel is Able to Effectively Use its Superior
Power Capabilities
Superiority in power capabilities does not in all cases and under all circumstances
convert into control over outcomes. For instance, the fact that Israel is a nuclear
power does not have a significant impact on conflict settlement between Israel and
Palestine. Yet, under the current circumstances, the gap between power capabilities
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at the disposal of the two parties is much too large than to expect that the Palestinian
side could fully neutralize Israel’s superior capabilities. However, its effectiveness
might be diminished, especially in the military sector.
Although Israel’s use of force against Palestinians is still characterized by self-
restraint (for example, Israel has refrained from overall air bombardment in the
Palestinian Territories), the degree to which self-restraint is practiced by Israel has
been increasingly reduced since the beginning of Al-Aqsa Intifada. To an
incomparably higher degree than in the 1990s, in the period of Al-Aqsa Intifada,
Israel resorted to the destruction of Palestinian public infrastructure (offices and
installations of the Palestinian Authority, roads etc.), means of production (especially
cultivated land), private property (mainly houses), as well as killings of human
beings (e.g. in the frame of so-called “targeted killings” of presumed terrorists
often involving the death of “bystanders”). Many Israeli military operations
conducted in the last three years created outrage among Human Rights
Organizations, such as Amnesty International and HRW, as well as among many
states. Nevertheless, due to the unequal distribution of power in the international
system, these reactions had only a limited impact. The Israeli government managed
to justify its military operations as legitimate acts of self-defense against Palestinian
suicide attacks to both the USA and its own society.
Thus, from a rational point of view, the strategy of suicide attacks should be
abandoned in order to avoid their anticipatable devastating impact on the
Palestinians. By doing so, the American tolerance of Israeli use of force against
Palestinians would certainly not vanish, especially since occupation in itself, which
has been tolerated by the USA for decades, is a basically violent system of rule;
yet, it would be reduced to a significant degree. Moreover, and probably even
more important, if Palestinians refrained from using force against Israeli civilians,
the divisions of Israeli society would break up. Although there are no reasons to
assume that the tiny minority in Israel who firmly believes that occupation should
be abandoned without restriction, giving up the strategy of suicide attacks would
terminate the Israeli spirit of belonging to “one family” holding together the vast
majority of Jewish Israelis against what they believe is a threat to the existence of
the State of Israel.
Civil forms of resistance, especially if suitable for broadcasting on television,
could channel the Palestinian energy of resistance in a much more efficient way.
When thousands of Palestinians from Ramallah area escorted the coffin of Faisal
Husaini in order to participate in his funeral on Al-Haram al-Sharif in Al-Quds
on June 1st, 2001, the soldiers could not stop them from passing the checkpoints
freely and the snipers posted on the roofs could not shoot at the Palestinians
waving Palestinian flags in Salah al-Din Street in Jerusalem. The reason why this
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impressive event of Palestinian civil disobedience did not receive the merits it
would have deserved is that in the night of the same day a major Palestinian
bombing attack was committed at the Dolphin discotheque in Tel Aviv covering
all the attention of the international media.20
4.1.2 Embarking on Strategies to Reduce the Power Gap between Palestine and Israel
In the military and economic sectors, Palestinians do not have realistic chances in the
foreseeable future to improve their power capabilities to a degree that would make a
significant difference to the conflict situation with Israel. However, in the sphere of
diplomacy and politics there are so far unused promising resources. The most important
potential for Palestine is democratization. It is true that fully-fledged democratization
is not possible under the circumstances created by the Israeli occupation in general,
and its response to the Al-Aqsa Intifada in particular. Paradoxically, this is exactly
the reason why it should be embarked on. Since the minimal prerequisite for the
start-up of a process of democratization in Palestine would be the withdrawal of the
Israeli Army to the lines of the period before the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel would come
under severe pressure to do so, especially since, due to its officially propagated vision,
the USA could not simply reject a credible Palestinian demand for democratization.
Nevertheless, when in February 2002 the European Union and on June 24, 2002, US-
President Bush brought up the issue of democratizing Palestine in 2002, the PA’s
approval on the initiatives was half-hearted at best. After the speech of US-President
Bush, “the Palestinian leadership made a show of preparing itself”21 for national
elections scheduled for January 2004, then adjourning them sine die in December
2003. The Palestinian Authority never conveyed the impression that there is no
alternative to democratization in a credible way, for instance, by setting up a date for
national elections and at the same time, threatening with self-dissolution if Israel
prevented them from taking place. Obviously, the Palestinian Authority preferred to
preserve the power it had, no matter how limited it was. Only when Israel and the
USA took advantage of the maneuvering policy of the Palestinian Authority by
confining their demands to install one of the most prominent members of the
authoritarian PLO elite, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), as prime minister, President
Arafat relented because he recognized that even the few capabilities that Israel had
been ready to leave to him were sufficient to marginalize Abu Mazen.
20
 Refraining from using force against Israeli civilians does not necessarily imply to confine to civil
forms of resistance only. Rather, from a strategic perspective, divisions in the Israeli society might
also rise if the Palestinian armed resistance were directed against military targets and the infrastructure
of settlements in the Occupied Territories only.
21
 Charmaine Seitz, The Palestinian Elections That Never Were, in: Middle East Report Online, January
23, 2003, available at: www.merip.org, May 23rd, 2004.
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Demanding democratization would not only improve the Palestinian diplomatic
power in the short term, but also in the long run since legitimizing occupation
over an authoritarian system is much easier than over a democratizing society.
Moreover, the problem-solving capacities of a democracy are much higher than
those of an authoritarian system. In other words, the Palestinian contribution to
the stalemate that Palestinians have to face after more than three years of Al-
Aqsa Intifada is that authoritarian leaders prevent the free development of
alternative concepts and personnel. Thus, one of the reasons why it is plausible
to argue that there is nobody who could replace Arafat as the political leader of
the Palestinians is a strong indicator for the “success” of his own policy. Yet, the
issue of concepts should be given priority to the issue of personnel. Therefore,
instead of demanding a “unified leadership”, as it has become common in Palestine
after three years of Al-Aqsa Intifada, there should be a prior understanding of
what aims this unified leadership should pursue by taking which measures. Thus,
beyond pressing ahead with elections, a pluralistic debate on the issues of
Palestinian aims and strategies should be pursued.
4.2 The Radical Approach
Palestinians who are not ready to accept the implications of the fact that, in the
foreseeable future, any negotiations with Israel will fall short of a complete
withdrawal of the Israeli Army to the borders of 1949 and the Israeli acceptance
of the right of return, must embark on changing the power asymmetry between
Israel and Palestine before attempting a final agreement with Israel. However,
due to the extremely large power gap between the two actors in all major fields,
there is no realistic chance to catch up with Israel in the near future. The
conclusion to be drawn from a rational choice perspective is that those who are
not willing to tolerate bowing to the superior Israeli power at all, should be
prepared for the fact that it will take an indefinite period of time before they
might have the chance to succeed.
The rational choice approach systematically takes into account the relevance of
time. If we have the choice between yielding a gain in the present and the very
same gain in the future, we will prefer to have it in the present time simply since
we do not know whether we will be alive in the future. However, the perspective
of those Palestinians who are not ready to bow to Israeli power is that yielding
gains in the short to medium run-concluding a final peace agreement with Israel
which does not meet major Palestinian aspirations-would bar the way to yield
larger gains in the future. Thus, it can be argued that those Palestinians who reject
to sign an “unfair” agreement with Israel are not irrational if they are aware of the
fact that their project of an agreement acceptable to them requires a very long,
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possibly inter-generative, time horizon.22 Furthermore, the rational behavior to be
derived from this preference is to improve the conditions for stamina-sumud.
However, committing bombing attacks against Israeli civilians is incompatible
with this strategy since, due to the Israeli military reaction, its implication is self-
destructive in terms of infrastructure, as well as economic and social development.
Note that from a rational point of view, it does not matter whether the Israeli reaction
is justified or not; what matters is that the Israeli reaction can be anticipated. To
put it in a more positive way, the strategies worked out on the basis of the moderate
approach are fully compatible with the strategies to be chosen by those preferring
the radical approach. Thus, despite the disagreement among Palestinians whether
to sign an agreement with Israel in the foreseeable future, thereby bowing to superior
Israeli power, or to refuse to do so, from a rational choice perspective, they could
and should agree to abandon bombing attacks against Israeli civilians and to embark
instead on democratizing Palestine.
5. Conclusion
There can be few doubts that Al-Aqsa Intifada was a failure. This does not mean
that Palestinians were close to achieve their aim of self-determination in September
2000. However, in May 2004, the way off to self-determination seems to be even
much longer and the conditions for sustainable development have significantly
deteriorated in this period. Although the bleak situation Palestinians have to face
to date is, first, the direct result of Israel’s strategy to take advantage of its superior
power capabilities in the period of negotiations with the PLO in the 1990s and
second, of Israel’s literally powerful response to Al-Aqsa Intifada, which had
started as an uncoordinated uprising out of widespread frustration and even despair
among Palestinians. Nonetheless, quickly it was institutionalized by major
Palestinian opposition movements, thereby establishing suicide attacks as a
systematic strategy of struggling against occupation. As has been argued,
regardless of the ethical implications of these attacks, committing them against
Israeli civilians was a negative choice if the aim was embarking on self-
determination for the Palestinian people.
22
 Jon Elster (footnote 2, p. 11) goes even a step further. He contradicts the view that “Preferring the
present over the future is like preferring apples over oranges, and de gustibus non est disputandem.”
shared by many rationalists. Rather, “(...) a person who takes his future states as given, rather than
something to be created, is fundamentally irrational. Moreover, I believe a person will be better off by
striving for connectedness, since only then will he be able to form the long-term plans that are a
condition for living a meaningful live, even in the presence.”
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Thus, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the strategy of conducting
military attacks against Israeli civilians was clearly irrational. Although it is beyond
the scope of this paper to discuss this problem in more detail, it is worthwhile
mentioning that suicide attacks against Israeli civilians may appear more rational,
i.e. a behavior suitable to achieve a given goal, if we assume that they did not aim
at the liberation of Palestine but at challenging the authoritarian Palestinian
Authority. After the failure of the negotiations of Camp David and Taba, which
also marked the failure of the Oslo approach as a whole, the leadership of the
Palestinian Authority stubbornly refused to take political responsibility. In this
situation it became apparent to the Islamistic opposition that the only way to prevail
against the Palestinian Authority, which despite its failure was not ready to share
power, was to make the detour via Israel in order to curtail the power of the ruling
elite headed by President Arafat. In other words, possibly the primary aim of the
opposition movements conducting suicide attacks was to contain the Palestinian
Authority with the help of Israel. If so, effectively struggling occupation is secondary
to increase one’s own internal power position, not only for the ruling leadership,
but also for the major opposition movements in Palestine. Be it as it is, both the
Palestinian Authority and the Islamistic opposition movements failed in developing
a rational strategy to terminate Israeli occupation. It is high time to use the resources
available to the Palestinian people in a much more efficient way than both the
Palestinian Authority and the major opposition movements proved to be able to.
The best way to herald a change would be to democratize Palestine.23
23
 See also Martin Beck, Who Is and Who Should Be Afraid of Democratizing Palestine?, in: Jerusalem
Times No. 540, 2004, p. 14.
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